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Market-Based Price-Risk Management for Coffee Producers 
 
Sushil Mohan∗
 
Coffee is characterised by high levels of price fluctuation, which exposes coffee 
producers to price risk. Coffee is widely traded in international commodity futures 
markets. This offers scope for producers to mange their price risk by hedging on 
these markets. The hedging mechanism proposed is based on the use of put 
options. The paper uses historical data of actual coffee put options contracts to 
estimate the costs of the mechanism; the benefits are inferred from field evidence. 
It emerges that the costs are relatively low, the benefits outweighing the costs for 
most producers. The paper then looks at the operational feasibility of the 
mechanism for producers and compares it with other hedging mechanisms. The 
mechanisms differ in their strengths and weaknesses; their choice largely 
depending on their viability in individual coffee producing countries.   
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Coffee1 is the developing world's biggest trading commodity2, with annual export quantity 
varying in the range of 4.8 to 5.4 million metric tons and export value varying in the range of 
US$ 5 to 12 billion over the period 1997 to 2005 (ICO, 2006). Coffee is almost entirely 
produced in developing countries and mostly consumed in the developed world. A key 
feature of the world coffee market has been the substantial short-term fluctuations in coffee 
prices, both at the level of international markets as well as markets relevant for coffee 
producers (hereafter producers). This exposes producers to high levels of price risk.  
In the past, chosen policies in response to price variability relied on market 
interventions to maintain prices within agreed ranges. The interventions essentially took the 
                                                 
∗ Department of Economic Studies, University of Dundee, Dundee DD1 4HN, United Kingdom. Tel: 01382-
384381 E-Mail: s.mohan@dundee.ac.uk 
1 Unless specified otherwise, ‘coffee’ means green (raw or unroasted) beans. 
2 The term ‘commodities’ refers to ‘primary commodities’ and it excludes petroleum, because petroleum is a 
special case as regards market structure and price trends. Commodities are mostly agricultural products and 
minerals in the raw, semi-processed or processed form in which they are first traded internationally. These 
products are generally inputs into the manufactured products. 
  
 form of export supply management through regulations or buffer stock schemes. For their 
impact on producer welfare, the policies are in general regarded as unsuccessful. The cost of 
reduced volatility seemed too high, given that the administered prices usually were far below 
the certainty equivalent that would be accepted by producers – for evidence on this see 
Krivonos (2004). From time to time there is talk about producer cartels as a solution to low 
and variable coffee prices, but too many sources of supply negate the scope for successful 
supply control3 (Maizels et al., 1997). Nevertheless, interest in supply management shall 
persist, but mainly for the purpose of raising prices rather than as a solution for price 
variability. 
 The initiation of economic reforms in developing countries in the late 1980s resulted 
in countries liberalising their coffee sector by replacing state-controlled marketing systems 
with markets run by private agents. The reforms are expected to bring clear benefits to 
producers from introduction of more efficient markets, but they also give rise to new 
problems, the most important being that price risk is thrown back onto the local producers 
and intermediaries, who are ill equipped to deal with it. Price risk poses a greater problem for 
them because they lack market power, due to their sheer numbers and wide geographic 
spread, and have limited ability to hedge4 their risk exposure (Gilbert, 1999). Therefore, how 
to manage best the negative consequences of volatile markets for producers remains a key 
issue for governments and policy makers.  
 In recent years, a growing body of work has contributed to a change in thinking 
toward policies that emphasise the management of price risk – policies that deal with market 
uncertainty using market-based solutions for hedging the risks arising from the uncertainty. 
Such approaches accept as immutable the market’s view of relative prices, but address 
directly the negative consequences of volatility (Varangis et al., 2002). The increasing 
globalisation of commodity markets and the introduction of new information technology 
provide new opportunities for commodity producers and exporters in remote parts of the 
world to make efficient use of commodity-linked financial risk management instruments like 
futures and options for hedging their price risks. In line with this thinking, the World Bank 
and the United Nations constituted the ‘International Task Force on Commodity Risk 
                                                 
3 The Association of Coffee Producing Countries’ members promoted a retention scheme from October 2000 to 
hold back and release coffee supplies on the basis of world market prices, but the experience of the scheme has 
been disappointing. It is difficult to maintain the continuing commitment of the parties to the discipline of the 
agreement, while free-rider problem persist with those suppliers outside (Hallam, 2004). 
4 Hedging means to take action to reduce a risk that has already been undertaken. 
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 Management in Developing Countries’ (hereafter ITF) in 1999 to bridge the gap in 
commodity risk-management markets in developing countries.   
Coffee is widely traded in the international commodity futures5 markets. The 
international community feels that this offers possibilities for producers to manage their price 
risk by hedging on these markets. This approach raises certain important questions:  
 
• How important is price risk for producers? 
• How reliable is futures market price risk hedging for them?  
• What are its costs and how do they compare with the potential benefits?  
• What is the most effective way of providing price risk management to producers?  
 
 It is beyond the scope of this paper to comprehensively answer all the questions. The 
first two questions have been well researched in the literature, so the paper restricts to 
reporting the current thinking on them. The focus of the study is on the third and fourth 
questions, which are not understood fully in the literature and are important for policy 
planners.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the significance of price risk 
for producers and the section thereafter discusses the reliability of futures market price risk 
hedging for them. Section 4 models the ITF proposed price risk management mechanism for 
producers. Section 5 estimates the returns (costs) of the mechanism, while Section 6 analyses 
its welfare benefits. Section 7 reviews the operational feasibility, problems and challenges of 
delivering price risk management services to producers. Section 8 concludes.  
 
2 Price risk faced by producers 
 
Producers face three main risks in the production and marketing of coffee: price risk from the 
volatility of prices; production (yield) risk from the uncertainty of production; and currency 
risk due to exchange rate fluctuations. Producers are not concerned with the risks per se, they 
are important to them to the extent they affect their income. Proponents of price-risk hedging 
acknowledge that it addresses only a portion of the underlying income risk problem, the 
extent of risk reduction achieved depending on the nature and magnitude of production and 
currency risks. But they argue in its favour on the ground that the hedging decision of a 
                                                 
5 Includes markets for other related instruments such as options and swaps. 
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 producer is based on their individual perception of price risk relative to other risks, its costs 
are known up-front, and a producer has the leverage to choose the time horizon and the 
quantity of output they desire to hedge. In addition, price-risk hedging does not deter 
producers from hedging their other risks. On the contrary, it allows them to use a 
combination of hedging instruments to optimise their hedging requirements.  
 The evidence appears to support that price risk is relatively more important for 
producers. Past studies for agricultural commodities that are traded in the international 
market, find that for the most part, price effects tend to dominate quantity effects – at least 
when measured globally. Larson et al. (1998) decompose the variance, in logs, of world 
export earnings for selected agricultural commodities into price effect and quantity effect 
over the period 1970-1995. They find the price effect to be the most significant determinant 
of export earnings volatility for all the selected commodities except maize. The ITF (2002) 
field survey reports: ‘nearly all farmers interviewed cited volatility of prices a greater risk 
than volatility in production. They also considered the price risk for coffee as being 
substantially greater than other crops’.  
The ITF study also found that producers are less concerned about currency risk: 
‘producers are happy to use both a price insurance level and a price against which the 
insurance is settled denominated in US dollars’. This is because the problem of variability of 
real exchange rates is becoming less serious as countries increasingly adopt sound central 
banking principles. The exchange rate is well managed and is determined on the basis of 
market forces. Also, if countries are pegging their currency to the US dollar or if an 
appreciation of the domestic currency against the dollar is highly unlikely, hedging currency 
risk may be dispensed with.  
 It is difficult to exactly define price risk; the most accepted being the difference in the 
expected sale price, on the basis of which a producer makes production and marketing 
decisions, and the actual sale price. Coffee producers assume price risk while taking 
decisions regarding application of inputs and labour on the basis of price they expect to 
receive after harvest and processing, which may turn out to be different from the actual price. 
Therefore, price risk reflects the risks associated with changes in the price of output that may 
occur after the commitment to production or store has begun and hence is essentially the 
result of price uncertainty.  
Although questions concerning how to measure price uncertainty over time have 
generated considerable debate, for commodities we usually use the price instability index, 
which measures the average deviation from trend. The advantage of the measure is that it 
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 separates random price variability from systematic variability. Coffee enjoys most of the 
characteristics (low price elasticities of demand and supply, low income-elasticity and lagged 
output response) that contribute to high levels of price variability (Mohan, 2004). Macbean 
and Nguyen (1987) find that the instability index of coffee (real world prices) for the period 
1951-80 is 39.7. For the arabica coffee traded in the NYBOT the average historic volatility 
over the entire period 1994-2001 was 42 per cent (ICO, 2003).  
 How price risk affects producers may vary according to their individual 
circumstances. In general, it impacts their ability to optimise output because the risk may 
induce them to compromise on input usage and diversify their risk exposure by engaging in 
activities in which they enjoy relatively lower comparative advantage. The unpredictable 
prices also make it difficult for them to plan longer-term investment to improve productivity 
or quality of the output. It is incorrect to assume that price risk affects producers only if 
actual price is lower than the expected price. It also affects them in the opposite case, because 
producers may have lost the opportunity of higher production and higher income.  
 
3 Derivative market hedging: reliability for producers 
 
A derivative market price risk management does not guarantee that the profit on the contract 
will fully offset the loss to a producer on the physical transaction. This is because under the 
contract, a producer will not be locking in their producer price, but rather a price on the 
commodity exchange for coffee. If the Exchange price remains stable, while the producer 
price falls, even with a price risk management in place, there would be no compensation for 
the lower producer price. This does not necessarily imply a loss, because the opposite, that is 
compensation without lower producer price, is equally possible. But it means that the 
hedging purpose of producers will not be served if producer prices do not move in lockstep 
with Exchange prices on which the hedging instrument is based. This lack of correlation 
between the two prices is the so called ‘basis risk’ – it is the risk arising from the possibility 
that the difference between the two prices (say at the NYBOT and in ‘producer countries’) 
may change in unanticipated ways. The hedging mechanism is designed to swap total market 
risk for basis risk. A greater unpredictability in the basis, or higher basis risk, reduces the 
effectiveness of risk management.  
The economic reforms and liberalisation of coffee marketing in producing countries 
has promoted a greater degree of vertical integration in coffee markets. There is now a closer 
cointegrating relationship between coffee grower prices and terminal market prices, meaning 
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 that the transmission of price signals from the world market to domestic producers has 
improved: the countries that have liberalised fully experience almost instant pass-through of 
prices today (Krivonos, 2004). The ITF (2002) study, using weekly data from 1996-2001, 
found a high degree of vertical integration (around 99 per cent) in the El Salvador and 
Nicaragua coffee-marketing sector; prices at each level of the marketing chain are derived 
from prices on the international commodity exchange for coffee. Varangis et al. (2002) study 
report similar results for other coffee producing countries, Côte d’Ivoire being an exception, 
but explained by the very strong stance taken by the government in the late 1980s on 
controlling producer prices. Fortenbery and Zapta (2004) find, more or less, similar results 
for the coffee markets of Guatemala and Honduras. The evidence clearly supports the 
reliability of futures market hedging for producers. 
The integration of the two markets is also obvious from a large number of producers 
subscribing to receive regularly information on coffee futures on their beepers or fax 
machines. This illustrates their high degree of understanding of how these prices affect local 
prices. Nevertheless, there is always an element of basis risk involved in any hedging 
strategy. This should not undermine the strategy, as it is the usual risk taken on by any hedger 
in return for eliminating risks associated with changes in general prices (Fortenbery and 
Zapta, 2004).  
 
4 The price risk management mechanism 
 
Coffee is actively traded in the London International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE) 
and the New York Board of Trade (NYBOT) commodity exchanges. The ITF developed test 
cases to evaluate the feasibility of making the LIFFE/NYBOT price risk management 
instruments available to coffee producers in El Salvador, Tanzania, Mexico, Uganda and 
Nicaragua. Initial results suggest that producers: (i) have little difficulty with the concept of a 
floor price for the coming crop, and payment of some premium to insure that price; (ii) 
understand that the premium level would depend on the price level, period and the quantity of 
produce that they elect to insure; (iii) are generally reluctant to sacrifice upside price 
potential, their concern is primarily to avoid unfavourable outcomes, periods of price slump, 
in which they cannot meet essential cash expenditures. Based on this, the instrument 
suggested is the purchase of ‘put or put type options’, where the strike price of the put 
effectively guarantees a price-insurance to producers in the form of a minimum price floor. 
The insurance can be a purely financial transaction not requiring a commitment regarding 
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 physical trade of the commodity, therefore avoiding risks relating to delivery and 
performance under the contract (ITF, 2002).  
 The LIFFE/NYBOT coffee contracts specify a standard lot size and are not available 
locally, which makes them inaccessible to small producers. The ITF risk management 
mechanism proposes that small producers access the instrument through local intermediaries, 
who can be commodity traders, exporters, local banks or futures merchants, producer co-
operatives or even large producers. A large number of producers purchase 'put options type' 
floor price insurance from intermediaries, who in turn offset their assumed risk exposure by 
purchase of an appropriate number of LIFFE/NYBOT coffee put options contracts. 
For the initial analysis, we specify that producers directly purchase put options, the 
involvement of intermediaries and the costs of intermediation are incorporated later on. Let 
us say that at time t a producer purchases a put options contract with a floor price PFP 
maturing at time t+x. The contract confers to the producer the right, but not the obligation, to 
sell the options underlying futures contract for the floor price on any day up to maturity of 
the contract. For the sake of simplicity we restrict the contract to be settled only at maturity 
time. If the cash price of the options underlying futures contract (that is, the official futures 
settlement price which is announced daily) at maturity time t+x is, say PSP, then the value of 
the options contract can be written as: max(0, PFP – PSP). 
 The main cost involved in purchase of put options is its price, the options premium, 
which is paid up-front. The value of the premium depends on the floor price relative to the 
underlying value of the options futures contract, duration of the contract and the volatility of 
the coffee market prices. The other cost is the transaction cost comprising of the exchange fee 
and brokerage commission. For computing the total opportunity cost of options, the value 
(borrowing) cost of the premium payment and transaction cost for the duration of the options 
contract is added to the costs.  
 The currency denomination of the contract is US dollar. As discussed in Section 2, we 
abstract from the problem of currency risk and treat that producers are willing to conduct all 
transactions in US dollars. Given the private information (such as costs, resources and 
aversion to risk) available to producers, they can be expected to make their decision 
regarding the quantity of output they wish to hedge and the choice of floor price. The total 
revenue of a producer who hedges with put options can be expressed by the equation: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ QPQTORTOPPY KPOPPSPFPH ++++−−= ,0max ]      (1) 
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where 
 
YH = revenue if producer engages in hedging. 
PFP = floor price on the put options contract. 
PSP = official futures settlement price at maturity of the contract. 
OP = options premium. 
T = transaction costs. 
R = value cost per unit of the money for the duration of the options contract. 
QPO = output subject to put options. 
PK = spot rate (average) of the physical transaction. 
Q = total output volume. 
 
 Equation (1) shows the revenue to a producer and not the earnings, because earnings 
is revenue net of costs, and the equation only considers the costs of hedging and not the other 
production and marketing costs.  
 
5 Estimation of return (cost) of hedging for producers  
 
5.1 Review of past studies 
 
The finance literature has generated a number of models that provide a benchmark for 
valuation of options. Most models, the most widely used being Black and Scholes (1973), 
rely on the fact that the returns from the options exactly replicate their costs if continuously 
adjusted through the life of the options. In terms of Equation (2) it implies, if calculated over 
many years, OP = max(0, PFP – PSP). Therefore, whether a producer sells the produce with or 
without hedging, s/he is expected to achieve the same return over a long period, except for 
fee and commissions paid for hedging. However, studies of options markets show that, in 
practice, this does not hold. The problems of ill liquidity6 and the associated danger of 
systematic losses (that is, negative bias in the underlying futures market) tend to predominate 
in commodity markets, so costs of options may be higher than the return (UNCTAD, 1993).  
                                                 
6 Liquidity refers to the ability to buy or sell a large amount of derivatives contracts in a short time without 
significantly affecting price. Speculative profits cannot be eliminated by arbitration owing to lack of liquidity in 
the market. 
 7
  In general, it is anticipated that buying options would not, on average, result in gains, 
because otherwise the counterparty (options seller) would, on average, make losses. 
However, in principle, a positive return is conceivable because options sellers are concerned 
with the overall return from all transactions, they may have an incentive in offering attractive 
terms for put options in order to neutralise their risk by offsetting their position on the 
Exchange. Under such circumstances it is possible for hedging to result in a systematic 
increase in earnings.  
Using statistical tests, Hallett and Ramanujam (1990) found a positive bias in the 
return at the 5 per cent level for jute, coffee and copper. Claessens and Varangis (1993) 
simulate a put options strategy for the years 1957-1990 in which they buy four put options for 
coffee during the same period every year, they find that the payoffs is 2 per cent of the 
average spot price of coffee. A study by Sarris (1999) of trends in options transactions over 
the period 1975-1988 concludes that the maximum cost of provision of price insurance for 
coffee is not excessive, mostly below 2 per cent. Studies in the US for a range of agricultural 
products show that costs of hedging generally sum to less than 2 per cent of the value of the 
product (Harwood et al., 1999).  
For evaluating the efficacy of the hedging mechanism, it is crucial to assess its return 
(cost), because it is this that needs to be compared with the other welfare gains from it. The 
evidence from past studies is not explicit about the return from options and also the studies 
differ in their treatment of costs other than the options premium. The following sections 
empirically estimate the return taking into account all the hedging costs.     
 
5.2  Methodology and data 
 
The first term on the right hand side of Equation (1) depicts the return (cost if negative) on 
the options contract, OR, expressed as:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ POPPSPFPR QTORTOPPO +++−−= ,0max ]       (2) 
 
In the equation the variable PSP is unknown to the producer when the decision regarding QPO 
and PFP is taken. Without knowing PSP, advance estimate of the return is difficult to make. 
However, historical data of past several years is available for the entire LIFFE and the 
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 NYBOT coffee put options transactions, which can be simulated to estimate an average 
return and its range. 
The question that arises is which contracts to consider for calculating the return. 
Coffee cherries are harvested annually, and thereafter they undergo processing through to the 
stage of green bean coffee; hence the production cycle is over one year requiring inputs 
(investment) throughout the year as well as for post-harvest processing. Since producers 
assume price risk throughout the production and marketing cycle, there cannot be a 
standardised options contract in terms of timing of purchase and duration, a producer may 
choose to hedge at any time of the year for duration’s ranging from two to twelve7 months. 
We, therefore, calculate the return for all contracts traded, rather than restricting to contracts 
of specific duration or expiry dates.  
 Historical data of LIFFE and NYBOT provide information about QPO, PFP, OP, and 
PSP in Equation (2). Transaction costs, T, can be determined. Table 1 gives the charges 
applicable to outside users (non-member firms of the commodity exchange). The brokerage 
may vary over each transaction, but within a range, so we take an average. The charges (all 
figures in US$) are doubled to incorporate possible both sides of the transaction and a safety 
margin, giving an estimate of T: LIFFE $20 per contract ($4 per ton); NYBOT $40 per 
contract ($2.35 per ton). Value cost, R, can be computed as the duration of the options 
contract is known, this determines the period of credit and the cost of borrowing is taken as 
15 per cent per annum. 
 
Table 1: Transaction cost for options contracts, 2006  
 
Exchange 
 
Contract 
(tons) 
Exchange 
Fees 
Floor 
Brokerage* 
Brokerage** 
 
Average 
Brokerage 
LIFFE 5 $0.55 N/A $4.30 – 12.90 $9.25 
NYBOT 17.010 $1.35 $2 $5.00 - 25.00 $16.50 
*Fee paid to the company who executes the order in open outcry markets. **This is the range 
from the most active to the least active clients.  
 
 For comparing the returns over a period, we compute them as a percentage of the spot 
(sale) price of coffee. We use PSP as an estimate of the spot price since its value reflects the 
                                                 
7 Active options trading is limited beyond the future period of 12 months. 
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 spot price at the time of maturity: the difference between the current price and the futures 
price will narrow as the contract draws near maturity, approaching the actual market price; if 
this were not so, speculators could make a sure profit by simultaneously trading in coffee 
spot and futures. This way the entire data set is drawn from the Exchange, the quality of 
which is assured, being a record of the actual transactions and prices quoted on the Exchange. 
 The returns for the LIFFE are calculated over the period 1992 to 2003 and that for the 
NYBOT over the period May 2000 to 2003. It was not feasible to consider data prior to 2000 
for the NYBOT because of very large number of observations. In view of the higher number 
of contracts for the NYBOT compared to the LIFFE, we consider periods of one year for the 
LIFFE and six months for the NYBOT for calculating the returns. The return over a 
particular period is the weighted average of the returns of all the contracts traded during that 
period. We also tabulate the returns by averaging only the negative returns in order to 
calculate an adverse scenario limit of the costs of options contracts.  
 
5.3 Empirical results 
 
Tables 2 to 6 summarise the results: Table 2 for the LIFFE, Table 3 for only the negative 
returns, similarly Table 4 and 5 for the NYBOT, and Table 6 for totals of both the LIFFE and 
the NYBOT. The tables are based on an analysis of a very large data set, but for the sake of 
brevity only the results are stated8. Column three of the tables depict the total volume of the 
put options contracts; four the average return; five the average spot price; and six the return 
as a percentage of the spot price.  
 
 
                                                 
8 The full data set can be obtained from the author. 
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 Table 2: Returns, LIFFE robusta coffee put options 
 
Period 
No. of 
contracts 
Volume 
(in tons) 
Average  
return ($/ton)
Average  
price ($/ton) 
Return as % 
of Price 
1992 34490 172450 9.25 852.40 1.09 
1993 83317 416585 -38.08 1213.94 -3.14 
1994 83813 419065 -47.58 3265.87 -1.46 
1995 61147 305735 6.89 2419.14 0.28 
1996 54323 271615 -24.83 1651.78 -1.50 
1997 83663 418315 -22.14 1723.38 -1.28 
1998 69429 347145 -13.45 1752.47 -0.77 
1999 76443 382215 54.51 1292.99 4.22 
2000 23116 115580 53.92 809.91 6.66 
2001 29161 145805 32.66 491.72 6.64 
2002 79402 397010 -27.17 685.70 -3.96 
2003* 29186 145930 -0.30 710.24 -0.04 
1992-2003 707490 3537450 -9.98 1575.69 -0.57 
*Only contracts until Nov 2003 expiry included.  
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 Table 3: Returns (negative only), LIFFE robusta coffee put options 
 
Period 
No. of 
contracts 
Volume 
(in tons) 
Average  
return ($/ton) 
Average  
price ($/ton) 
Return as % 
of Price 
1992 22823 114115 -29.81 885.28 -3.25 
1993 80296 401480 -39.83 1222.55 -3.26 
1994 78027 390135 -69.33 3269.27 -2.12 
1995 35767 178835 -80.86 2516.67 -3.21 
1996 45490 227450 -47.52 1663.46 -2.86 
1997 75193 375965 -46.12 1738.01 -2.65 
1998 58211 291055 -42.84 1794.51 -2.39 
1999 28630 143150 -38.06 1422.28 -2.68 
2000 3584 17920 -12.26 774.23 -1.58 
2001 8806 44030 -25.16 509.14 -4.95 
2002 77222 386110 -29.36 686.53 -4.13 
2003* 18151 90755 -24.26 716.46 -3.39 
1992-2003 532200 2661000 -45.60 1669.08 -2.73 
*Only contracts until Nov 2003 expiry included.  
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Table 4: Returns, NYBOT arabica coffee put options 
 
Period 
No. of 
contracts 
Volume 
(in tons) 
Average  
return ($/ton) 
Average  
price ($/ton) 
Return as % 
of Price 
2000(5-12) 134580 2289191 155.60 1631.93 9.53 
2001(1-6) 111894 1903304 89.77 1184.74 7.49 
2001(7-12) 80134 1363070 15.42 1032.89 1.49 
2002(1-6) 124587 2119211 -19.45 1142.14 -1.62 
2002(7-12) 160278 2726311 -19.51 1282.16 -1.44 
2003(1-6) 192216 3269573 -10.62 1345.81 -0.79 
2003(7-12)* 101084 1719428 -24.00 1344.81 -1.78 
2000-2003  904773 15390088 24.73 1301.30 1.90 
Short term ‘Serial options’ and ‘Mini-coffee options’ are not included.  
*Only contracts until December 2003 expiry included.  
 
 
Table 5: Returns (negative only), NYBOT arabica coffee put options 
 
Period 
No. of 
contracts 
Volume 
(in tons) 
Average  
return ($/ton) 
Average  
price ($/ton) 
Return as % 
of Price 
2000(5-12) 28613 486703.9 -56.16 2142.69 -2.62 
2001(1-6) 35105 597132.1 -36.19 1366.59 -2.65 
2001(7-12) 36015 612611.1 -66.63 1085.05 -6.14 
2002(1-6) 83596 1421959 -59.60 1182.56 -4.96 
2002(7-12) 114818 1953041 -54.34 1287.78 -4.22 
2003(1-6) 140880 2396353 -46.49 1369.22 -3.40 
2003(7-12)* 89659 1525090 -31.34 1344.81 -2.33 
2000-2003  528686 8992890 -49.75 1340.21 -3.64 
Short term ‘Serial options’ and ‘Mini-coffee options’ are not included.  
*Only contracts until December 2003 expiry included.  
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Table 6: Returns, totals for LIFFE and NYBOT 
 
Period 
No. of 
contracts 
Volume 
(in tons) 
Average  
return ($/ton) 
Average  
price ($/ton) 
Return as % 
of Price 
LIFFE  
1992-2003 
707490 3537450 -9.98 1575.69 -0.57 
LIFFE NR* 
1992-2003 
532200 2661000 -45.60 1669.08 -2.73 
NYBOT  
2000-2003 
904773 15390088 24.73 1301.30 1.90 
NYBOT NR 
2000-2003 
528686 8992890 -49.75 1340.21 -3.64 
NYBOT and 
LIFFE 
1612263 18927538 19.43 1352.58 1.36 
NYBOT and 
LIFFE NR 
1060886 11653890 -48.03 1415.30 -3.39 
*Negative returns only.  
 
 
5.4  Interpretation of results 
 
The cash loss from the options contracts, as a percentage of the sale price, varies over time in 
the range of –0.77 to –3.96, whilst the cash gain varies in the wide range of 0.28 to 9.53. This 
is because the loss of a put options contract is limited by the options premium and the other 
costs, while the gain depends on the contracts underlying futures price at maturity, which 
may vary over a much wider range depending on the volatility of coffee prices. Overall, for 
all contracts over the total period the return percentage is -0.57 for LIFFE, 1.90 for NYBOT 
and 1.36 for both combined. For LIFFE, 75 per cent of the total number of contracts resulted 
in a negative return, whilst for NYBOT the figure is 32 per cent. If we consider only the 
negative returns, the cash loss for LIFFE and NYBOT comes to 2.73 and 3.64 per cent 
respectively.   
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  The results come with a health warning – they are based on assumptions and 
averages. The assumptions relate to estimating the spot price and assuming standard 
transaction and money borrowing costs over the entire period though it may differ over the 
years. The estimated spot price, as explained in Section 5.2, is a realistic estimate of the 
actual. The transaction and money borrowing costs have not varied too much over the period, 
and are hence well represented by the standard. The assumptions being realistic are therefore 
unlikely to distort the results. The averages used are weighted averages and they represent the 
overall results fairly accurately.  
 Can it be said, on the basis of the combined empirical results of the LIFFE and the 
NYBOT (return of 1.36 per cent) that on the average, the option holder gets the costs back as 
gains from exercising the options? To conclude so requires simulation of past contracts over 
a much longer period of time for the NYBOT, because unusual circumstances during certain 
periods can affect the results. For example, the somewhat sharp and continuous fall in world 
coffee prices during the period 1999 to 2001 contributed to the relatively high cash returns to 
the option holders during this period. This is because a higher number of options were 
exercised during this period as the underlying futures settlement price mostly fell below the 
floor price. Hence, we can not say conclusively that the options pay back their costs or would 
do so in the future, but what is apparent from the results is that the cost of options is 
relatively low. 
 Therefore, adopting a cautious approach, and also in view of the LIFFE results being 
over a longer period of time compared to the NYBOT, we consider only the LIFFE results 
for the remaining analysis. The cost of put options over the last ten years for LIFFE has been 
0.57 per cent of the international coffee price and in adverse circumstances the cost should 
mostly remain below 2.74 per cent. This cost can be treated as indicative of the average cost 
to producers of hedging using put options. The inference is valid because the conditions in 
the Exchange are not likely to change drastically: put options contracts should, under normal 
circumstances, follow the past trend in terms of price of the options and transactions costs.  
In order to calculate the costs as a per cent of producer price, we make adjustments 
for the fact that producer prices are on the average 30 to 40 per cent lower than international 
spot prices (ITF, 2005). If 40 per cent is incorporated, the average cost rises from 0.57 to 0.95 
and the adverse scenario cost rises from 2.74 to 4.56 per cent of the producer price.  
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 5.5  Cost of intermediaries  
 
The cost of intermediaries in providing the price-insurance instrument to producers can be on 
three counts: i) the cost of its retail distribution; ii) the risk cost associated with any mismatch 
of the minimum price protection retailed to producers and the hedging of the assumed risk on 
the commodity exchange; iii) costs associated with non-performance by retail counterparties 
(can be considered very low because producers pay the costs in advance and the commodity 
exchange non-performance risk is covered).  
 There are two views on the level of the intermediaries’ cost. One, the intermediaries 
have a vested interest to provide the service at a very low cost to producers in order to ensure 
regular supply of the produce or to reduce the risk of loan default. Many country elevator 
operators in the USA appear willing to bear these costs to assure a timely flow of wheat and 
corn into their facilities. They routinely hedge their own risks and this is passed on to farmers 
at quite low cost (Harwood et al. 1999). The other view is that the involvement of 
intermediaries further increases transaction costs of hedging and impedes the flow of 
information.  
 Intermediaries could also provide over-the-counter (OTC) instruments that meet the 
specific needs of producers in terms of contract size, maturity, margin requirements, and 
settlement and delivery procedures. Estimating OTC transaction cost is difficult, because by 
nature, OTC transactions are not visible to the public, and the value of the factors at the time 
used in the pricing model are not determinable. According to ITF (2002): ‘it is anticipated 
that by using an OTC instrument it is possible to provide price insurance at a cost slightly 
lower than prices prevailing for straight commodity exchange traded options’. We can, 
therefore, treat OTC transaction costs to be the same as that of the Exchange.  
The ITF (2002) study considers the cost of intermediaries as being similar to the 
transaction cost in the Exchange. The transaction costs for the LIFFE/NYBOT are mostly 
below 0.1 per cent, so the cost of intermediaries can be safely fixed at 0.2 per cent of the 
producer price. If we incorporate them, the cost to producers of hedging becomes 1.15 per 
cent of the producer price, with the worst scenario limit being 4.76 per cent.  
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 6. Hedging: welfare benefits for producers 
 
6.1  Resource Allocation Gains 
 
According to the traditional theory of production, producers make production decisions, such 
as deciding recommended levels of input use, by equating marginal cost with marginal 
return. The theory is based on assumed certainty of the marginal returns and does not apply 
when the prevalence of risk and the reality of widespread risk aversion are recognised. 
Typically in coffee production the prices of the inputs are known at the time their levels are 
to be set, but the price of the output is uncertain, and the level of uncertainty may well be 
quite high. This makes it difficult for producers to efficiently plan their output, they usually 
do so by fixing some benchmark expected price of the output. This price is based on their 
expectation of outcome of prices at the time of intended sale and the variance of that 
expectation. A high downside risk-aversion attitude results in fixing of a low price to avoid 
an adverse (cash loss) outcome. Hedging, by offering price assurance, enables them to plan 
without worrying that financial viability could be jeopardised, making it easier for them to 
optimise output (or input usage). This could mean higher earnings from an increase in 
revenue net of costs.  
The degree of dependence of producers on coffee is quite high, with over 50 per cent 
farms deriving over 50 per cent of their income from it (ICO, 2003). This, coupled with lack 
of credit facilities, promotes a risk-averse attitude among them. Producers deal with risk by 
mainly using few to no inputs other than own labour9 (keeping production costs at the 
minimum), even though high yields require larger doses of fertiliser and other inputs. The 
cost of a typical coffee production comprises of variable cost (includes labour and material 
cost and ranges between 73-83 per cent), and the balance represents overhead (that is, the 
fixed cost structures of plantations) and processing cost. Only a reported 25-30 per cent of 
farmers apply any type of inputs, and they too at rates below, or at a small proportion of, the 
recommended rates. The low input and low yield production technologies could result in loss 
of up to 50 per cent of the potential yields (ITF, 2002). The low level of input usage is also 
evident from an ICO (1998) study, reported in Table 7. 
 
                                                 
9 Studies of farm activities by Reardon (1997) and Ellis (1998) found strong evidence that farmers in poor rural 
communities are risk-averse and take actions that result in lower, but more stable incomes. 
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 Table 7: Input use by activity for arabica coffee 
 
Inputs Minimum needs Levels of confirmed usage by 
producers 
Copper based fungicides 1 kg/ha (5 times) 7% 
Non copper fungicides 2 kg/ha (4 times) 26% 
Pesticides 1.5 litres/ha 34% 
Fertiliser 1 bag 15% 
Infilling/Replanting All ageing trees 47% small holder trees are 25-
50% overage 
Weeding 5 rounds per year 27% do 3 wet rounds 
Annual pruning  85-100% 
Mulching  13% 
Source: ICO (1998) 
 
The studies show that producers in general produce far less than possible. Although 
the reasons for this can be many, but price risk can be considered an important one, as it is 
the main risk (Section 2) faced by producers. Hedging by offering price insurance could alter 
this. This could mean the use of hired labour to weed the farm and add pesticides, fungicides 
and whatever is the best for the farm as well as for any processing or storage, potentially 
resulting in an increase in output and earnings. Field studies on the consequences of hedging 
for agricultural activities in the US support this: Markowitz’ (1959) concept of ‘expected 
value-variance efficient’, which states that expected return can increase only by accepting a 
larger variance of return, applies to most farm activities, and hedging by reducing the 
variance of return for a producer with a typical income utility function (which expresses 
averseness to risk) results in a higher expected return (Harwood et al., 1999). Studies on the 
implications of hedging for competitive firms also find that in the absence of hedging, the 
risk-averse producer selects a lower level of output (or input) than the amount he would 
choose if the price of the output were to be more certain, and the amount of output decreases 
as aversion to risk increases (Baron, 1970; Sandmo, 1971; Holthausen, 1979).   
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 6.2 Gains from specialisation  
 
Diversification is a risk management (self-insurance) method used by many agricultural 
growers. The idea is to reduce the risk of the overall return by selecting a mixture of activities 
that have net returns with low or negative correlation. The fact that coffee constitutes a high 
proportion of the income of many producers does not imply low levels of diversification. 
This is because coffee is their only export produce and the diversified activities are mostly 
subsistence activities characterised by very low cost and very low income (ICO, 2003).  
The common perception is that diversification comes at a cost because it reduces the 
ability to reap the benefits of specialisation and scale. Diversifying is held to supposedly 
reduce coffee yields not only by diverting land and effort to other activities, but also because 
yields per tree will decline. Although scientific inter-cropping with certain shade trees or 
crops may boost production, but inter-cropping resorted for the purpose of diversification is 
mostly not scientific (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1997). Hedging by reducing the need to 
diversify allows producers to accomplish greater degree of specialisation in the production of 
coffee, which may translate into higher earnings from an increase in output  and/or fall in the 
unit cost of production.  
However, contrary to common belief, some agricultural economists feel that the gains 
from specialisation are often less than may be imagined. A mixture of agriculture production 
activities may make better use of available resources: labour, cash flow and machinery 
requirement for a mixed system may be more evenly spread throughout the year, using these 
resources more efficiently. Moreover, the majority of the risk-reducing benefits from 
diversification can often be captured by having only two or at the most three activities, 
thereby not requiring excessive compromise on the comparative advantage. Also, a rational 
producer should be able to find the risk-efficient combination of activities, not the one that 
merely minimises variance. It is, therefore, difficult to say anything conclusively about 
specialisation gains from hedging for producers. 
 
6.3 Gains from improved marketing   
 
On a priori grounds, it can be expected that hedging would enable producers to achieve a 
higher average sale price (PK in Equation 2) of the physical output by improving their 
marketing capabilities, though it is conceivable that at times the final outcome may be that of 
a lower price. Protection of (downside) risk for part of produce should make it possible for 
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 producers to store coffee, if they so desire, waiting for a high price, thus giving them greater 
control over timing of the sale. This appears important for coffee because harvesting takes 
place in a few months, while selling takes place throughout the year. Although intuitively 
appealing, but it is difficult to establish empirically that this would result in net gains for 
producers. There have been studies on this for corn, wheat and soybean in the US: Heifner 
(1972) found some evidence that this would work for storage, as did Tomek (1987). 
However, others have found little evidence to support this possibility for producers (Irwin et 
al., 1996). 
 
6.4  Credit access gains   
 
The cash flow situation of producers can also constrain their ability to optimise input usage 
and exploit marketing opportunities. Here again, hedging presents scope for improved credit 
terms and access: if default risk is diminished by presenting the risk management instrument 
as part of collateral, lenders can feel more secure in providing finance and borrowers can feel 
more secure in obtaining finance (ITF, 2005).  
 
7. Delivering price risk management services to producers 
  
Our results show that the benefits for producers of managing their price risk using derivative 
markets are reasonably indisputable. This opens the door to the question of how most 
effectively to provide hedging instruments to them. For answering this, we analyse the 
operational feasibility of the ITF mechanism and compare it with other approaches that can 
be used for delivering risk management services to producers, namely developing local 
coffee futures market or main exchanges (NYBOT/LIFFE) establishing branch exchanges in 
producer countries.  
 
7.1 How practical is the ITF risk management mechanism for producers?  
 
The ITF risk management mechanism relies on local intermediaries to provide the risk 
management instrument on a micro basis. The intermediaries are expected to provide advice, 
knowledge, and expertise to close the gap between instruments and potential users. The target 
groups for intermediaries are co-operatives and producer associations that represent small 
growers and can gain economies of scale in acting on behalf of lots of them, but they can also 
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 be traders, exporters and local banks. The intermediary purchases the macro instrument from 
a wholesale provider (a local aggregator who deals with the exchange) and sells micro 
instruments in the retail market in a back-to-back manner. It is possible that some 
intermediaries may also act as wholesalers. For the purpose of this paper, we treat 
intermediaries to also include wholesalers.  
In Section 5.5 we noted that the cost of intermediation need not be too high. This 
presupposes the existence of viable intermediaries capable of fair and transparent discharge 
of their obligations. Not all countries have a good experience of co-operatives and producer 
organisations. The finances of many of them are in a mess. In addition, they have their own 
administrative costs, which can be rather high if they do not operate efficiently. Some of 
these organisations are sophisticated and financially strong, but they too need to be 
introduced and trained in the use of risk management instruments (Sarris, 2002).  
Even though the risk management instrument is simple and transparent, but the 
complex nature of intermediation requires the existence of trained personnel, together with 
control systems that these personnel do not abuse their positions. Appropriate systems must 
be in place that ensure transparency of the actions of intermediaries and that protect the 
interests of producers. It will be necessary to provide a very high component of technical 
support on a continuous basis to support such personnel and systems. Furthermore, making 
reasonable hedging decisions based on fine-tuned hedging instruments (future and options) 
requires permanent access to information and processing of the various data. The existence of 
intermediaries may not be conducive for free flow of information and this may limit the more 
general use of the hedging instruments.  
The risk management mechanism is limited in its scope. It caters mainly to the needs 
of producers. It ignores the hedging needs of other market participants, particularly exporters 
and traders, and even large producers and importers. Once an exporter (includes trader) has 
bought coffee from producers, s/he is open to risk of losses if international spot prices fall to 
below a certain level. Of course, if the prices rise s/he stands to gain. The pressure to 
eliminate their exposure as rapidly as possible can force them into back-to-back sales at less 
attractive but fixed prices than would otherwise be obtainable. A back-to-back sales policy 
can never be extremely precise, and the exporter may be required to ‘warehouse’ a residual 
‘long or short position’ if the quantities sold and bought does not match.  
The ability to hedge using futures and options can improve exporters’ ability to 
compete and access credit. Whilst futures trading eliminates any potential gains or losses to 
the exporter resulting from spot price fluctuations, the use of put or call options can put a 
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 minimum price floor under negative movements in spot prices whilst allowing the exporter to 
take advantage of gains resulting from price rises or fall, as the case may be. The 
disadvantage with options is that the premium required is often large. Currently, there is a 
limited degree of exporters’ participation in the use of marked-based mechanisms for 
managing their price risk. Given the relatively short-term nature of hedging requirement, they 
would seem to be ideally suited for the use of derivatives trading (Fontenay and Leung, 
2004). Therefore, a hedging mechanism should cater to their needs as well. This is important 
even if the objective is producer welfare, because their participation would also mean implied 
benefits for producers (Mohan, 2004).  
  There are problems relating to the costs associated from non-performance of retail 
counterparties. As long as the producer purchases the hedging instrument upfront or the ITF 
guarantees default on their part, there is no risk. But what about default risk on the part of 
intermediaries? This is not a problem if they offset their assumed risk exposure by purchase 
of matching quantity of LIFFE/NYBOT coffee put options contracts. If not, then it may 
require establishing and managing a margin account, which involves additional costs.  
We noted in sections 2 and 3 that the hedging mechanism does not cover for currency 
and basis risk, although these risks are not significant for most producers. This should not be 
treated as a major limiting factor because complete revenue insurance against price and 
currency risk cannot easily be designed. Nevertheless, the degree of exposure is important, as 
the mechanism would not work in countries were these risks are very large.  
 
7.2 Development of local Exchange 
 
Given that the ITF mechanism is not without its problems, does it represent a case for 
developing local coffee futures market? The most appealing case for doing so is the 
advantage of lower basis rate risk. In-country futures markets means having customised 
contracts designed with delivery specifications more closely linked to the way cash market 
transactions take place in the local market. If the basis risk is unacceptable, or if there are 
long time lags between price changes in the futures market and associated changes in the 
cash markets because of frictions in information flow, incentives may exist to develop 
domestic futures markets (Fortenbery and Zapta, 2004).  
Local futures markets can take into account the hedging needs of most market 
participants. Exporters, importers and medium to large producers can hedge directly on the 
exchange. However, to accommodate use by relatively smaller producers would require 
 22
 adjusting contract sizes according to their needs or promoting more flexible OTC products to 
supplement the exchange-traded product. An agent or broker of the exchange can offer OTC 
products to producers. This works much the same as the ITF mechanism, except for the 
advantage of proximity of the counterparties to the Exchange. 
The price discovery information in local Exchange will be more transparent to 
producers and local traders. They can access information about contracts and historical 
information with no restrictions, and they can correspond with their brokers, counterparties 
and advisors with no impediments. This could increase the value to producers of forward 
price information and increases access to forward pricing opportunities for that segment not 
wishing to hedge  
Developing a local futures contract priced in the domestic currency can manage not 
only the price risk of the export commodity, but also the currency risk. A futures contract 
priced in local currency could provide more useful hedging opportunities for producers and 
smaller intermediate marketers whose cash transactions are in local currency, but exporters 
and importers would still be exposed to, and need to deal with, exchange rate risk. Their lack 
of participation in local currency contracts makes transfer of risk difficult in the Exchange. It 
is for this reason that most existing futures exchanges in developing countries trade 
commodities priced in US dollars, and thus any exchange rate risk faced in these markets is 
the same as if they traded the same commodity on an outside exchange where contracts are 
priced in US dollars. 
The members of the Exchange can provide valuable services in marketing the concept 
of derivatives trading and the benefits of free market to participants in the market. SAFEX 
(South Africa Exchange for agricultural products), in the early days, spent many days on the 
road training and marketing the concepts of futures and options. The Exchange members 
have a vested interest to do so, which may not be the case with intermediaries because of 
uncertainty over their likely future evolution.   
The above factors, the standardised and transparent nature of trading and the clearing 
house taking care of performance risk by standing between both parties in the transaction can 
be expected to stimulate high trading volumes and encourage higher usage compared to 
intermediaries.  
However, there are several preconditions before an Exchange can be a viable 
proposition. Critical to the success of any local futures Exchange will be the ability to ensure 
a liquid market. Liquidity is an important parameter in attracting participation in derivative 
markets. Participants need to know that there is adequate depth in the market so that they can 
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 buy or sell a contract without the market moving significantly and also that they will be able 
to move out of the market (that is, close a position) quickly and efficiently. Hedgers will in 
general prefer to transact in a market with high liquidity rather than in an illiquid market 
where the contract more precisely matches their requirements. Local exchanges, because of 
limited size of the domestic market, may not generate sufficient participation by all market 
participants. Consequently, trading volumes (liquidity) remains at relatively low levels. 
Speculator activity adds liquidity to the market, and there may not be enough incentives 
(business) for them to be active in local exchanges. Finally, there are substantial costs 
associated with developing both the physical infrastructure, trading and regulatory 
environment necessary to develop a successful futures market (Morgan et al., 1999).  
Nevertheless, reasons exist for developing countries to encourage local exchange 
development even if the costs of doing so are high. In those cases in which either there is 
currently no traded contract or in which current international contracts correlate poorly with 
prices received by developing countries’ exporters and producers, and where there is 
sufficient speculative capital to make a local exchange viable, there may be some point in 
encouraging the establishment of a futures exchange for that commodity. If enough volumes 
are generated on both sides, then there is possibility of setting up commodity exchange on its 
own right. Therefore, only under certain circumstances would the creation of new commodity 
exchanges in producer countries themselves be worth supporting.  
 
7.3 Branch of the main Exchange  
 
It is suggested that established main exchanges (NYBOT/LIFFE) integrate backwards in 
producer countries for provision of risk management instruments directly to entities there. 
This can be through an agency relationship with institutions in producer countries or even by 
a direct presence. The form of arrangement is not material, as long as it functions as a branch 
of the main Exchange. The branch Exchange will use the price discovery and futures price 
and the premiums of the main Exchange. The main advantage of this approach is that it 
would achieve economies of scale from risk pooling with the main Exchange and its 
branches. This way the commercial price of the contracts will be determined at competitive 
terms in an actuarially fair way.  
The branch Exchange would need to make available appropriate contracts, either as 
Exchange-traded or OTC products, for producers and other entities in producer countries. 
The least the contract departs from terms and conditions existing in the main Exchange, the 
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 easier it will be for commercial operators to transfer or reinsure their risk, and hence the less 
expensive will be the contract. For instance, several put like options of an operator can be set-
off against a call options contract sold in the main Exchange.  
The branch Exchange offers most of the advantages of local futures market: price 
discovery, accessibility, standardised and transparent nature of trading, performance 
guarantee, and hedging choices for most market participants. The proactive involvement of 
the main Exchange can play a vital role in providing infrastructure, training and instruments, 
for market-based risk trading. What it does not offer is the advantage of lower basis risk, 
although under certain circumstances it can result in a reduction of basis risk. If the risk is as 
a result of frictions in information flow from the main Exchange to developing cash markets, 
then this flow is likely to improve with the activities in the branch Exchange.  
The key question is if it would be viable for main exchanges to establish branches in 
producer countries. The success of the branch would depend on the volumes of business it 
would generate. The LIFFE and NYBOT have the advantage of having large transaction 
volumes (liquidity) and are well established in terms of rules and regulations. The branch 
would benefit from the reputation of the main Exchange, and its well established futures 
market would attract a large number of financial institutions, brokers, traders and speculators, 
they will be prepared to participate in the new market, even in early days. This will help in 
providing it with liquidity and the critical mass of operators required for the working of a 
vibrant Exchange. 
Furthermore, the greater degree of vertical integration in the world coffee market has 
resulted in less transaction on the demand side of the coffee supply chain, whilst untapped 
and growing market exists on the supply side. This also holds for other commodities that are 
traded in international markets. This is why commodity futures merchants, investment banks 
and international commodity trading companies (such as Cargill, Neuman Kaffe Gruppe and 
Volcafe) are now keen to be more actively involved in developing countries, especially 
countries with large markets such as Brazil, Mexico, China, Colombia and India (ITF, 2005). 
Importers and traders locating in producer countries make offset each other risks easier in the 
branch Exchange. These factors point to the growing opportunities for main exchanges to 
develop institutional foundation in emerging markets.    
The main concern in retailing of risk management instrument to producers is that the 
transactions cost of making contract size small and ensuring its availability to producers may 
be prohibitive. This need not always be the case, as operators should be able to demonstrate 
that economies of scale may make provision of the instrument in bulk at reduced transactions 
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 cost. Also, the contract size need not be very small. The ITF (2005) report states that risk 
management is not strictly for the poor. The main clients are commercially-oriented 
producers. They may have small land plots but they are producing a reasonable surplus that 
they market. They are not subsistence farmers, but those that spend money on inputs. It is 
realistic to accept that the main beneficiaries are the commercially-oriented farmers. This 
should not diminish the value of price-risk management per se, but we must have realistic 
expectations. In addition, it is possible for agents of the branch Exchange to offer smaller size 
contracts as an OTC product to producers. As a matter of fact, OTC providers will be more 
active in the branch Exchange, because higher liquidity in the Exchange makes it easier for 
them to offset their risk. 
 Another concern is the high establishment costs of the branch Exchange. Here again, 
there are possibilities for the main Exchange to affect savings from exploiting partnership 
arrangements with organisations in producer countries and from utilising its own resources 
and skilled professionals. The branch Exchange could also achieve economies of scale from 
dealing in diversified hedging activities.  
 
7.4 The way ahead  
 
Given that the hedging strategies discussed in sections 7.1 to 7.3 differ in their scope, benefits 
and limitations, it is difficult to choose one over the other. All we can do is draw some broad 
conclusions. Local exchanges have their merit, but are viable only under certain 
preconditions, which do not often exist in several emerging markets, so setting them may 
prove to be premature and could also be counterproductive (see Tsetsekos and Varangis, 
1999 for a discussion on this). A branch Exchange offers the same service as the ITF 
mechanism, with a much wider scope, and also offers most of the benefits of a local 
Exchange. Furthermore, it does not deter, as a matter of fact, when it is clear that conditions 
are appropriate and that proper foundations exist, it will be easier to establish a local futures 
market – it serves as a step in that direction. Therefore, encouraging branch exchanges 
appears to be the recommended approach, but in markets where they are not feasible or 
viable, there is no alternative but to rely on the ITF mechanism.  
Whatever the mode of providing risk management, producer countries need to 
provide the institutional framework within which risk management activities may be carried 
out, because the financial regulations may affect the ability and capacity of a financial service 
provider to offer derivative products. A liberal foreign exchange environment is required to 
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 make hedge transactions on international markets. It is imperative that orders associated to 
the transactions are executed immediately they are made and therefore cannot await 
confirmation of the availability of the required currency. Reliable telecommunications links 
are also required if price information and hedging decisions are to be reliably and promptly 
communicated both to and from international markets and within the country.  
The political necessity for governments to be involved often in financially 
unsustainable farm price support schemes means that governments can also be potential 
beneficiary of futures trading in commodities. Not only can the derivatives market be less 
expensive to manage and operate than traditional price support programs, it is also friendlier 
towards free trade. Therefore, it is in the interest of governments and the international 
community to support and encourage its development. The role of the international donor 
community, the ITF and governments in channelling funds to education and training policy 
makers, producers and other users of derivative markets, and also to support them in using 
such market mechanism for risk management is quite important in early years.  
 
8 Conclusion  
 
The liberalisation of coffee marketing in coffee producing countries has increased the direct 
exposure of producers to price risk. The international community feels that producers can 
mange their price risk by hedging in the international futures market (LIFFE/NYBOT) for 
coffee. The hedging mechanism proposed is based on the use of ‘put type options’ offered to 
producers through intermediaries. The paper uses historical data of coffee put options 
contracts transacted in the LIFFE and the NYBOT to infer the likely cost of the hedging 
mechanism for producers. The important result that emerges is that the cost is relatively low, 
being 1.15 per cent of producer price, the adverse scenario cost being 4.76 per cent of 
producer price.  
Although the low cost points in favour of hedging being a viable proposition for 
producers, but to say so conclusively requires the welfare gains from hedging for producers 
to exceed the cost. In the absence of data, it is not possible to empirically estimate the gains, 
but field studies overwhelmingly support positive payoffs, especially from producers being 
able to allocate resources more efficiently in the production of coffee. The magnitude of the 
gain can be quite high, given the high level of risk-aversion attitude among producers and the 
uncertainty of coffee prices. Another benefit for producers is from improved access to credit 
on finer terms.  
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 The conclusion reinforces the challenge for the international community, 
governments and risk management providers for making price risk management operational 
for producers. An analysis of the operational feasibility of the proposed hedging mechanism 
shows that its success depends on the existence of viable intermediaries, who play a vital role 
in bridging the gap between producers and the Exchange. Such intermediaries may not be 
forthcoming in many producer countries. Another limitation of the mechanism is that it 
ignores the hedging needs of other entities in producer countries.  
The paper also looks at other ways of providing risk management services to 
producers. These can be through developing domestic futures exchange for coffee or through 
main exchanges (NYBOT/LIFFE) establishing their branches in producer countries. It 
emerges that trading volumes in most producer countries may not suffice to justify 
establishment of viable local exchanges. Branch exchanges offer similar service to producers 
as that of the proposed hedging mechanism with added advantage of proximity and 
transparency. Therefore, their establishment is a step in the right direction. This study 
concentrated on coffee, but the analysis can be extended to a multitude of commodities.   
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